Prior to the …nancial crisis mainstream monetary policy practice had become disconnected from money. We outline the basic rationale for this development using a simple model of money and credit in which we explore the conditions under which money matters directly for the conduct of policy. Then, drawing on Goodfriend and
Introduction
The standard, mainstream macroeconomic model (Woodford, 2003 , Galí, 2008 has little, if any, independent role for the money supply. Money is endogenous and adjusts with movements in the demand for money. The use of the nominal short term interest rate as the instrument of policy insulates the real economy from shocks to the money market. This insight goes back to Poole (1970) who showed that the use of the interest rate as the instrument of policy insulates the economy from shocks to the demand for money. More recently, Ireland (2000) has shown that Poole's result carries over to the New Keynesian model. This dichotomy would suggest that there will be little short term relationship between changes in the stock of money and credit and output and in ‡ation, even though in the long run the price level will rise in proportion with the stock of money. This paper contributes to this discussion by considering why and in what circumstances the monetary authorities should pay attention to the monetary aggregates.
Despite the clarity of this result in the mainstream theoretical model, there is con ‡icting empirical evidence on the role of money and credit in business cycles. For example, Reynard (2007) provides evidence to suggest there is a systematic empirical relationship between movements in money and subsequent prices and output. Using data for the US, the Euro area and Switzerland he …nds that monetary developments provide information about subsequent in ‡ation. Nelson (2002) also …nds empirical evidence of a direct e¤ect of base money on output. He argues that money may be acting as a proxy for various yields that a¤ect aggregate demand. By contrast, Ireland (2004) provides a model in which empirical measures of real money balances must …rst be adjusted for shifts in money demand in order to isolate the e¤ects of money on output and in ‡ation. Even when taking this into consideration, he …nds that money plays a minor role in explaining the business cycle. 1 Andres et al (2006) examine the role of money using an estimated model of the Eurozone built on a dynamic equilibrium framework. They …nd that, …rst, consumption is not a¤ected by money balances. Secondly, shocks to money demand can forecast real balances, but it requires real shocks to explain the bulk of ‡uctuations in prices, output and interest rates. Favara and Giordani (2009) o¤er a direct evaluation of the contribution that money can make to explaining movements in in ‡ation and output. Using a VAR, they …nd that shocks to monetary aggregates appear to have substantial and persistent e¤ects on in ‡ation, output and interest rates.
Benk et al (2005) take a di¤erent approach and construct a measure of credit shocks and …nd the credit shocks have a role in explaining GDP. The credit shocks it is argued are the product of legislative changes in the regulation of banks in the US. The mainstream view that narrow de…nitions of money (M0 and M1) do not appear to have signi…cant real e¤ects draws on the early work of Chari et al (1995) who found that monetary aggregates covary mainly positively with output because money demand is primarily driven by aggregate shocks to the private economy. Christiano et al (1999) …nd that shocks to money demand measured by narrow measures of money (M0 and M1) do not have signi…cant real e¤ects while shocks to M2, which involve a measure of credit, has some signi…cant real e¤ects.
At …rst blush the di¤erent empirical results in the literature are di¢ cult to reconcile. One obvious possibility is that over the sample periods being used monetary policy was not always conducted strictly along the lines of the new Keynesian framework. There, as we have already noted, the role of the short term interest rate is central. It is certainly true for example in the United Kingdom, there were signi…cant periods during which monetary aggregates were targeted or else the exchange rate. A policy of an explicit reliance upon the short-term nominal interest rate started only in 1992 with the formal adoption of in ‡ation targeting. It may be that these alternative regimes impart a su¢ cient departure from the canonical new Keynesian model for e¤ects of money to show up in the data. Moreover, the European Central Bank has always followed a two-pillar approach. The …rst of these gives a prominent role to a 'broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments'and the second pillar relies on a monetary analysis of trends (Stark, 2008) .
But we are interested in explaining the results with reference to the prominence of shifts in the supply of bank credit. 2 The role of banks, other …nancial institutions and the …nancial system -that provide loans and help determine asset prices -are often given particular prominence in discussions on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 3 And so a signi…cant corpus of economists have not given up entirely on the idea that the monetary aggregates can sometimes contain information about the future state of the economy, as well as about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 4 To borrow an analogy from Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) 'the ‡ow of money and private securities through the economy is analogous to the ‡ow of blood...money is the blood that dispatches resources in response to those (price) signals (p. 5)'. More recently, and especially in the light of recent turbulence in world …nancial markets, economists have been re-examining the role that money, and more generally credit, can play independently of the policy rate. One avenue we explore in this paper, is motivated by the role of money as a suppler of payment services to credit constrained consumers. The price, as a premium above the policy rate, of such loans re ‡ects the marginal costs to banks of their supply and so it responds to increases in the e¢ ciency of supply relative to the demand for loans. This relative price can move out of line with the policy rate set by the central bank when there are independent sources of ‡uctuations in the ability of banks to supply liquidity, for example, as a result of their e¢ ciency in screening loans (monitoring) or the value of posted collateral. The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we consider the role of money in a highly stylised macro model and show that, in accordance with with the mainstream literature, that shocks to money demand do not a¤ect output and in ‡ation. We then go on to consider a version of this model with credit following Bernanke and Blinder (1988) . There is an external …nance premium (EFP) so that there is not always a one to one correspondence between the interest rate set by policymakers and that which lenders pay. In this case the monetary authorities cannot completely insulate the real economy from shocks in …nancial markets, compared to the situation in which only money demand shocks matter. This leads to a modi…cation of the standard Taylor principle for the stability of the model under an interest rate rule. In particular factors that determine the supply of loans can alter the appropriate policy response to in ‡ation. To help to ‡esh out this insight with a more fully speci…ed and micro-founded model, in Section 3, we re-examine the role of money for policy in the context of Goodfriend and McCallum's (2007) model which adds a banking sector to a DSGE model. 5 This means that shocks in the …nancial sector that a¤ect the external …nance premium can now alter output and in ‡ation. In Section 4, using an impulse response analysis we show that under an in ‡ation targeting policy, money and …nancial spreads become negatively correlated when shocks to the supply of bank loans dominate those to money demand or to productivity in the real economy. Section 5 explores the conditions under which money provides a reliable signal about in ‡ation and output and considers a number of simple augmented rules to capture the signal. We observe that when supply shocks dominate in the money market, spreads and money move in opposite directions and so one rule that has attractive properties is one that employs information about the di¤erence in money and spreads. We show that such a rule is better able to stabilise the economy compared to a simple in ‡ation targeting rule when there are shocks to …nancial markets. Section 6 concludes and o¤ers some directions for future work.
Money, Credit and Interest Rate Rules
In the …rst part of this section we take a stylised version of the New Keynesian model and show the standard result that as long as the policy rule satis…es the Taylor principle, output and in ‡ation can be insulated from money demand shocks. In the second part we go on to re-examine this result in a NK version of Bernanke and Blinder's (1988) credit model, in which …nancial spreads also matter for the level of output. We now …nd that monetary policy also needs to be responsive to conditions in credit markets which we capture by the external …nance premium (Meier and Müller, 2005) in order to stabilise output and in ‡ation. First, consider a simple model of money demand (for which supply is implicitly perfectly elastic) appended to a standard New Keynesian 5 See Curdia and Woodford (2010) for an alternative take on the importance of the EFP.
framework (see King, 2002) , which uses a monopolistically competitive supply side with Calvo price setting. And examine, in this simple setting, that the stock of money plays is essentially decoupled and plays no role in the determination of output and in ‡ation.
In the simple New Keynesian model all variables are expressed as log deviations from steadystate. Equation (1) gives aggregate demand, y t , as a function of this period's expectation, E t ; of demand next period, y t+1 , and of the expected real interest, where R t is the policy rate, E t t+1 is the next period expectation of in ‡ation and is the intertemporal rate of substitution in output. 6 Equation (2) is the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve that relates current in ‡ation, t , to discounted expected next period in ‡ation, where is the subjective discount factor, and is proportional to the deviation of aggregate demand from supply, where is the slope of the Phillips curve. 7 In equation (3) real balances, h t p t , are held in proportion to demand, y t , and inversely with the opportunity cost of holding non-interest paying money, R t , with a semi-elasticity, . Equation (4) is a simple interest rate-based rule that is used to stabilise in ‡ation about its steady state value with the weight on in ‡ation given by . The supply side of the economy,ỹ t , which we interpret as the ‡ex-price level of output is given by (5) . Finally, is the fraction of …rms that hold prices …xed and so (1 ) is the fraction which are given a signal to re-price as a mark-up over marginal costs thus in ‡ation in equation (6) is simply the ratio of …rms that re-price at the new price level, p t , relative to those that cannot re-price.
The system is subject to stochastic shocks, A;t , B;t , C;t , D;t , E;t which are respectively to demand, mark-up, money markets, monetary policy and to aggregate supply.
We can substitute (4) into (1), (5) into (2) and solve (6) for p t and substitute into (3) to give 6 This intertemporal equation also operates as the basic asset pricing equation in a New-Keynesian model. 7 The term is related to two deep parameters in the underlying Calvo-Yun model (see Yun, 1996) : the probability of …rms maintaining a …xed price in the next period, , and the subjective discount factor, : In in ‡ation space can be shown to be equal to (1 ) ) and thus in price space, with the deviation in the price level proportional to in ‡ation (see equation 6), the Phillips curve becomes: p t = E t p t+1 + (1 ) (y t ŷ t ) + 1 A;t : Under either formulation in ‡ation or the price level is less responsive to the output gap as ! 1: us a system of three di¤erence equations that can be written in vector form, if we suppress the stochastic errors, as:
where the transpose of the vector of state variables x t is:
where is a 3 x 3 matrix. The existence or not of a unique solution for x t , as is well understood, given the forcing processes, t , 8 will depend upon matching the number of eigenvalues of the matrix within the unit circle with the number of predetermined state variables. And typically the coe¢ cients of the policy rule, (4) , are set to ensure local determinacy. 9 What concerns us here is the role, if any, that money, h t , plays in this economy. We note that the matrix, , can be written in block form:
Where A is 2 2, C is 1 2, D is a 1 1 null matrix and 0 is a 2 1 null column vector. The block triangularity of means that its eigenvalues are simply given by the eigenvalues of A; referring to h t y t i and D, referring to [h t ] : Also the determinacy of follows from the determinacy of A given D is a null matrix. In this case, with both in ‡ation and output non-predetermined, determinacy will require A to have two eigenvalues outside the unit circle and for the trace T r(A) to be positive. This requires the Det(A) T r(A) > 1, for which a necessary and su¢ cient condition is that:
Which is the familiar condition that for stability real rates must increase (decrease) by more than any positive (negative) in ‡ation shock. This solution is recursive in that as long as in ‡ation and output are pinned down to a unique solution path then the money stock (and the price level) is (are) also determined in each period. In other words there is no role here for the money stock to destabilise the economy independently. This is essentially the New Keynesian generalisation of the Poole assignment. Using the short term interest rate as the instrument of policy the real sector can be insulated from shocks to the demand for money. Moreover, shocks to aggregate demand can also be o¤set completely (Galí, 2008 ).
Credit in a NK Model
We now consider how a primitive banking sector can be introduced into the NK model using the approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) . Aggregate demand in equation (1'), now depends on the interest rate on loans in the credit market, R m t , rather than directly on the policy rate, R t , for which we will now solve:
The Phillips curve is (2) as above. So the interest rate on loans is determined by market clearing, for which we will now solve. The real supply of loans by banks, l s t p t , depends positively on the external …nance premium (R m t R t ) and on (real) bank deposits, (d t p t ) where c can be interpreted as a measure of the extent of leverage of loans over deposits, while the costs of monitoring or the availability of collateral would be re ‡ected in c .
We now turn to the real demand for loans, l d t p t , which depends negatively on the external …nance premium,
Bank deposits, replacing money demand in (3), are held to …nance output,
Equating l s t = l d t and suppressing stochastic terms, we can solve for the market interest rate in terms of the policy rate, which is set by (4) , and the parameters of loan supply:
Solving for the equilibrium in the market for loans, and using the policy rule in (4) we can reduce the model to the two equation system
where c = c c+ c
. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the stability of this model is now:
In contrast to the standard New Keynesian model the policymaker needs to be more responsive to in ‡ation in order to o¤set the e¤ect of developments in credit markets and more so when banks increase their loans supply relative to their deposit base. Hence the new condition (14) tells us that if money (or credit) is provided at an interest rate that di¤ers from the policy rate, R t , which itself varies with the costs of monitoring and the availability of collateral (or with the extent of leverage in the banking sector) the policymaker has to o¤set that spread as well as ensuring the policy rate increases or decreases the real rate. In other words the price at which money is supplied by the banking system might matter. The model examined in the following section gives us a micro-founded route to the result here and starts to …ll in the missing arguments of a typical NK model by suggesting that the money/credit a¤ects both aggregate demand and policy.
A General Equilibrium Monetary Model with Banking and Credit
As pointed out by Goodhart (2007) and by Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) money (aggregates) should be be made to mattter in general equilibrium models as they a¤ect consumption decisions of liquidity constrained households and the spreads across several …nancial instruments and assets. And as Woodford (2007) states 'money matters' in such circumstances as it may be the root of disequilibrium and instability in the economy originating from the …nancial sector. A way to incorporate money and …nancial spreads into a general equilibrium setting is to study the banking sector proposed by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) . 10 The main feature of the model is the inclusion of a banking sector alongside households, production and the monetary authority. The model by GM complements the traditional accelerator e¤ect (Bernanke et al., 1999) with an attenuator e¤ect, which is present in the model because monitoring e¤ort is drawn into the banking sector in response to the expansion of consumption, which is accompanied by an expansion of bank lending that raises the marginal cost of loans and the external …nance premium.
The main feature of this model is the underpinning of household, production and the monetary authority with a banking sector. Households, who are liquidity constrained, decide the amount of consumption and the amount of labor they wish to supply to the goods production sector and to the banking sector. They also demand deposits, money (liquidity), as a function of the amount of consumption they wish to …nance. The production sector is standard (Yun, 1996) , characterised by monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, subject to productivity shocks. Pro…t maximising …rms decide the amount of production they wish to supply and the demand for labour. By clearing the household and production sectors we can de…ne the equilibrium in the labour market and in the goods market. These two sectors also provide the standard relationship for the riskless interest rate and the bond rate.
Finally, the banking sector matches deposit demand from liquidity constrained consumers with a loan producing technology. Speci…cally, banks substitute monitoring work for collateral in supplying loans. More monitoring is achieved by increasing the number of people employed in the banking sector and therefore reducing employment in the goods production sector. A fractional reserve requirement with a …xed reserve-deposit ratio is assumed. Given this technology banks decide on the amount of loans they can supply and the amount of monitoring required. At the same time households'consumption is a¤ected by the availability of loanable funds. The Appendix lists all the model equations.
Consumption and Collateral
But we can summarize the relationship for consumers in the GM framework around an equilibrium steady state c in the reduced form (subscript t denotes deviations from steady state and variables with no subscript are steady-state parameters):
With the presence of a cash in advance constraint, a shock to velocity, v t ; will increase consumption. Consumption, c t , is also positively a¤ected by the amount of monitoring work, m t ; where is the share of collateral in the loans production function and (1 ) represents the share of monitoring costs. It is also a¤ected by the amount of collateral represented by bonds, b t , and capital whose value is given by q t . A positive shock to monitoring, a2 t ; by increasing the e¢ ciency with which banks produce loans, increases the supply of loans and therefore consumption. Similarly a negative shock to collateral, a3 t ; by reducing the price of capital, q t ; will negatively a¤ect consumption. The parameters c, b and k 1 represent the steady-state fraction of consumption in output, the holding of bonds and a composite parameter re ‡ecting the inferiority of capital compared to bonds as liquidity. 12 The demand for monitoring work is given by:
A higher wage, w t ; will reduce the resources devoted to monitoring. Similarly monitoring will be a¤ected by the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal value of households'funds, t :
The steady state parameters, m, w, and represent the steady-state proportions of employment in the banking sector, the level of the real wage, and the ratio of the weight of consumption in the utility function relative to the steady-state shadow value of consumption. With a banking sector of this type in the model, we can link money and asset prices directly 11 The model is fully derived in the extended technical appendix available from the authors'website. 12 The parameter
is a function of the ratio of consumption to output, c, of the parameter re ‡ecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k; of steady-state capital, K; and of the trend growth rate, .
to output and in ‡ation, as consumption, which accounts for most of the ‡uctuations in output in this model, is closely dependent on money market perturbations, the development of banking technology and asset prices outcomes. Now money and lending a¤ect consumption, the level of economic activity and will also have implications for asset prices.
A key term here is the marginal value of collateralized lending, t ; which increases as consumption rises and falls as collateral becomes more widely available:
t depends on the value of the collateral, q t and b t , on a collateral shock, a3 t ; and on consumption, c t . Higher levels of consumption increase the marginal value of capital and hence the collateral value, q t : The increase in collateral value leads to more borrowing and more consumption. The parameter k 2 is again a composite coe¢ cient similar to k 1 :
13
The marginal value of collateralized lending also feeds back into the capital asset price equation, q t :
In (18) the marginal value of collateralized lending, t ; potentially can amplify asset price volatility and magnify the response of the economy to both real and …nancial shocks. Both real, a1; and …nancial shocks, a3; directly feed back into asset prices alongside the expected marginal productivity of capital [mc t+1 + (1 ) (n t+1 + a1 t+1 )] where mc t+1 denotes marginal cost in period t + 1, is the share of capital in the goods production function and n is employment in the goods production sector. Similarly expected asset prices, E t q t+1 ; the change in the shadow value of households' funds (E t t+1 t ) alongside the wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the shadow value of funds also a¤ect the value of capital, q t . The parameter 1 is a composite function of the depreciation rate of capital while the parameter 1 is a composite function of steady-state marginal costs, of steady-state employment in the goods sector and of the capital share in the production of goods. 14 13 The parameter k 2 = kK c is a function of k, of steady-state capital, K; and of the steady-state ratio of consumption, c: 14 The
is a function of the discount factor, ; of the depreciation rate of capital, ; and of the trend growth rate, :
is function of steady-state employment in goods sector, n, of steady-state marginal costs, mc; of steady-state capital, K; and of the parameter re ‡ecting the capital share in the production function of the goods sector, . Details of the derivation are reported in the technical appendix.
Interest Rate Spreads
The last building block involves the determination of interest rate spreads. The benchmark theoretical interest rate R T is simply a standard intertemporal nominal pricing kernel, priced o¤ real consumption and in ‡ation. It can be written as one-period Fisher equation:
The di¤erence between the interbank rate R and R T is the external …nance premium, which is the premium paid by the private sector for loans:
The external …nance premium, EF P t ; is the real marginal cost of loan management, and it is increasing in velocity, v t ; real wages, w t ; monitoring work in the banking sector, m t ; and decreasing in consumption, c t . 15 The external …nance premium is also dependent on the share of collateral costs in loan costs ( ) ; and reserve requirements (rr); but as these two parameters are both constant in this model they do not appear in the log-linearization. The yield on government bonds is the benchmark rate, R T ; minus the liquidity service on bonds:
where (c t + t ) measures the household's marginal utility relative to the household's shadow value of funds while is the marginal value of the collateral. In the model these key margins -the real marginal cost of loan management versus the liquidity service yield -determine the behavior of spreads.
Finally the monetary authorities, who set the interbank lending rate, are assumed to follow a simple in ‡ation targeting rule in the …rst instance:
In this section we have outlined, brie ‡y the key elements of the GM model and explained how it links explicitly output to developments in the monetary sector and how the interaction between those sectors determine …nancial spreads. In the following section we shall analyze the key responses of the model to a series of shocks and try to infer from this what is the relationship between money and in ‡ation, and what role …nancial spreads play. 15 The collateralized external …nance premium is simply the uncollateralized external …nance premium multiplied by (1 ), i.e. the share of monitoring costs in loan costs, and it is less than the uncollateralized external …nance premium. As the shares and (1 ) are constant both the collateralized and uncollateralized versions of the EFP coincide when log linearized.
Model Results
The model is solved using the solution methods of King and Watson (1998) who also provide routines to derive the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to di¤erent shocks, to obtain asymptotic variance and covariances and to simulate the data. The simulation is carried out by running a random number generator in Matlab. Following a …xed random seed, we generate a set of normal distributed exogenous shocks of length K = 10; 000. These random shocks are fed into the recursive law of motion of key variables for which see the Technical Annex. For the impulse response analysis and simulation exercise we examine the e¤ects of real and …nancial shocks described in Table A3 . We also report the choice of moments for the forcing variables. These are standard parameters in the literature.
Calibration
Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we choose the consumption weight in utility, ; to give 1/3 of available time in either goods or banking services production. 16 We also set the relative share of capital and labour in goods production to be 0.36. We choose the elasticity of substitution of di¤erentiated goods, , to be equal to 11. The discount factor, ; is set to 0.99 which is the canonical quarterly value while the mark-up coe¢ cient in the Phillips curve, ; is set to 0.05. The depreciation rate, , is set to be equal to 0.025 while the trend growth rate, ; is set to 0.005 which corresponds to 2% per year. The steady-state value of the ratio of bond holdings to GDP, b, is set to 0.56 as of the third quarter of 2005. The parameters linked to money and banking are de…ned as follows. Velocity at its steady state level is de…ned as the ratio of US GDP to M3 as of the fourth quarter of 2005, yielding 0.31. The fractional reserve requirement, rr ; is set at 0.005, measured as the ratio of US bank reserves to M3 as at the fourth quarter 2005. The fraction of collateral, ; in loan production is set to 0.65, the coe¢ cient re ‡ecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k; is set to 0.2 while the production coe¢ cient of loan, F; is set to 9. The low value of capital productivity re ‡ects the fact that usually banks use a higher fraction of monitoring services and rely less on capital as collateral. Turning to the parameters in the various policy rules, 17 we set the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation with in ‡ation targeting, T , to be equal to 50 as in GM in order to re ‡ect a strong response to in ‡ation and a smoothing parameter, , equal to 0.8; the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation with a Taylor rule, , is set to 1.5 while the coe¢ cient on output, y , is set to 0.5 as in GM. For the rule which responds to asset prices we assume a coe¢ cient on asset price growth, q , equal to 0.5. 16 Tables A1 and A2 of the appendix report the values for the parameters and steady-state values of relevant variables. 17 The policy rules are described in more detail in Section 5.
Implied Steady-States
With these parameters values we see that the steady state of labour input, n; is 0.31 which is close to 1/3 as required. The ratio of time working in the banking service sector, m m+n , is 1.9% under the benchmark calibration, not far from the 1.6%, share of total US employment in depository credit intermediation as of August 2005. As the steady-states are computed at zero in ‡ation we can interpret all the rates as real rates. The riskless rate, R T ; is 6% per annum. The policy rate, R;
is 0.84% per annum which is close to the 1% per year average short-term real rate (see Campbell, 1999) . The government bond rate, R B ; is 2.1% per annum. Finally the collateralised external …nance premium, R L R, is around 2% per annum which is in line with the average spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate in the US. 18 
Examining the Role of Money in this Economy
In this section we describe, brie ‡y, the e¤ects of a series of shocks to productivity, velocity and to two types of shocks to the …nancial sector. 19 As is implied by Section 2, the dynamics of the model suggests that a key role is played by the loan rate, the external …nance premium and policy rate, as a regulator of demand. For example, any shock that raises collateral value will increase the supply of loans. At the same time the collateral shock will increase the demand for deposits and therefore the amount of monitoring work that needs to be carried out by banks. So the increase in the amount of employment in monitoring work will increase the real marginal cost of the management of loans and so the positive e¤ect of higher collateral will be attenuated. What we try to do here is simply assess the impact of some key driving forces both on the quantity of money in this model and also the external …nance premium at which that money is supplied.
Goods productivity
A shock, a1; to goods productivity, 20 under the in ‡ation targeting rule, can be stabilised. Hence hours worked in the goods production sector, n; and the benchmark rate R T are almost invariant to the shock. 21 However c; w; q; m are all higher. In fact with hours worked in goods production relatively stable, increased productivity shows up as higher consumption c and higher real wages w: Also increases in q re ‡ect a higher marginal product of capital. The increase in monitoring hours m re ‡ects the increased demand for and supply of deposits. The combined e¤ect is to increase the 18 The equations for the steady-states are listed the extended technical appendix available on request. The solution for the steady-states uses a nonlinear routine in Maple and the …le is also available on request. 19 The diagrams of the impulse responses to mark-up, money and government shocks are available on request. Those discussed here are available in the technical appendix which can be found on the authors'webpages. 20 The benchmark model has 20 endogenous variables fc; n; m; w; q; P; ; mc; H; b; ; EF P; R T ; R B ; R; R L ; R D ; ; ; T g, 5 lagged variables fP 1 ; H 1 ; c 1 ; b 1 ; R B 1 g and 7 exogenous shocks fa1; a2; a3; "; ; ; ug. We report only the results of the four shocks a1; a2; a3; v:
21 For R T t this happens as R T t = t + E t t+1 E t t+1 where the in ‡ation rate and changes in are almost zero.
EFP. But the movement of money (deposits/loans) in the same direction as the external …nance premium implies that money would be a poor indicator of …nancial conditions, as the increase in money does not imply that there has been an in ‡ationary monetary expansion.
Banking productivity
Again under an in ‡ation targeting rule, a shock to banking productivity, a2 is stabilised and therefore so is the benchmark interest rate. Because of higher banking productivity, monitoring hours, m; decline while there is little e¤ect on the value of collateral q; on consumption c and on real wages w: The combined e¤ect, by reducing the marginal costs of loan supply is to decrease the EFP. In this case therefore money might indicate some loosening of …nancial conditions.
Collateral prices
Under in ‡ation targeting, a positive shock to collateral, a3; leads to stable in ‡ation and benchmark interest rate, R
T . There are small increases in c and w: As we have a positive shock to collateral there is a fall in monitoring hours m, which dominates the costs of loans supply: The overall e¤ect in general equilibrium is to reduce the EFP, alongside an increase in the quantity of money. In these circumstances, the increase in money is associated with some loosening of …nancial conditions.
Money velocity
With an in ‡ation targeting rule, a positive shock to velocity v increases c; w; n and in ‡ation. Because the capital/labour ratio is lower, the price of capital q rises while hours of monitoring, m, decrease as the existing stock of money works harder. The joint e¤ect is a decrease in the EFP and a fall in the money supply. 22 In this case, as with the productivity shock, money does not turn out to be a good indicator of in ‡ationary pressure.
The information content of money
Overall we …nd that money plays a crucial role in driving the EFP when the banking sector itself is the source of the shock (i.e. monitoring e¢ ciency and/or collateral shocks) with banks becoming more or less able to supply a given quantity of loans. It is this independent source of supply shocks to the loanable funds market which drives the EFP in the opposite direction to that of the quantity of loans and so can act to compress (unwind) yields when there liquidity becomes abundant (scarce).
We can examine the information content of money more formally in the GM model by examining some properties of the simulated data. We can simulate the model under the benchmark case and for illustrative purposes we can also raise the standard deviation of a2 and a3 shocks from 1 to 5% to examine what happens when such shocks are dominant. Table 1 -for the benchmark shocks and banking dominant shocks -shows, on the left hand side of the table the lead, contemporaneous and lagged correlation between money and in ‡ation and output from HP …ltered simulations. The main di¤erence in the two cases is that when banking shocks dominate, money has positive rather than negative lead information for in ‡ation. Following King (2002) , the …nal two columns show the sum of contemporaneous money and 4 lags of money in a regression of in ‡ation and of output on lags of in ‡ation, output and money. We can see that money has signi…cant information for in ‡ation in both cases but when banking shocks are dominant, money has positive information, in the sense that positive money growth leads to higher in ‡ation. It would therefore seem appropriate for central banks to place emphasis on monetary aggregates when banking sector or loans supply shocks dominate.
Reconsidering Simple Policy Rules
The previous section has shown that monetary and …nancial conditions might well matter when setting monetary policy, over and above the policy rate. We concentrate on comparing shocks to the supply of banks loans involving collateral or monitoring costs. Note that a negative shock to the …nancial system originating in a rise in the cost of monitoring loans or a reduction in the collateral of borrowers has a opposite-signed impact on money and on the external …nance premium -in this case money will contract and the spread widen. This suggests that the information on the spread and money might be used to inform monetary policy, that is to say as well as reacting to in ‡ation directly the central bank can also respond to the spread.
Before considering this point in detail, we assess the e¤ectiveness of the various policy rules proposed by Gilchrist and Saito (2006) . We use the following rules for comparison.
Targeting Rule
The policy rate is set by a feedback rule responding to in ‡ation, t , with parameters, T , where we assume that the policymaker targets zero percent in ‡ation.
Money Rule. We also consider an alternative rule where the central bank controls the growth of high powered money:
where h t = log(H t ) and h t denotes the growth rate of H t . In (24) we assume that 0 <j H j< 1 while t is the random component of policy behaviour.
Taylor Rule with In ‡ation and Output. We assume, as also in GM, an alternative rule where policy-makers respond to output, y t , and in ‡ation, t ; while also smoothing interest rates:
with 0 < < 1: In contrast to the in ‡ation targeting rule (23) where the policymaker targets zero in ‡ation, the weight on in ‡ation, , is lower at 1.5.
Policy Rule with Asset Price Growth. We also consider, as in Gilchrist and Saito (2006) , an alternative formulation of (25) where the policy-maker responds to the growth rate of observed asset prices, q t :
Augmented Rule. As an illustration of how policymakers might seek to respond directly to supply side shocks to the supply of loans -as suggested by equation (14) -we now assume that the monetary authority augments its in ‡ation targeting rule with a term in the di¤erence between the external …nance premium and money to capture the impact of the supply of money:
where h is money and EF P is the external …nance premium. In this case when there is a demand shock, h t and EF P t will move in the same direction and the augmented rule will have the same e¤ect as an in ‡ation targeting rule. But when the shock is to the supply of loans, money and the external …nance premium will move in opposite directions, thereby altering the interest rate set by the monetary authority.
In the next section we assess the policy outcomes both in terms of the volatility of output and in ‡ation and a welfare approximation of the representative household from the implementation of a rule that targets zero in ‡ation versus alternative rules that respond to aggregate demand, money, asset prices and the augmented rule. The welfare analysis will allow us to better understand how the policy maker should respond when banking shocks dominate.
Welfare Analysis
We …rst consider a welfare criterion often used to assess policy alternatives that depends only on the variance of output and in ‡ation (e.g. Galí (2008) ) and employs a standard loss function:
Given the primitive utility function of GM model, we also trace out the direct welfare consequences for the representative household. The use of the approximation allows us to quantify precisely the welfare rankings arising from each of our policy rules, possibly allowing some normative statements. We derive a quadratic loss function using a second-order Taylor approximation to utility by using the labour demand function, marginal cost function and salesproduction constraint to substitute for household consumption. 23 Once re-ordered and simpli…ed
we are left with a loss function with relevant terms in the variances of consumption, in ‡ation, wages, employment in the goods sector and the marginal cost.
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with L t = 1 2 . In the next section we will evaluate each policy rule under standard loss function (28) and the welfare approximation (29) when the standard deviation of the …nancial shocks rise.
Policy Experiment
Using both the welfare criteria, we can calculate the loss under each policy rule when we increase the standard deviation of banking shocks and then rank them using the metric laid out by Gilchrist and Saito (2006) .
The gain is de…ned as the di¤erence between the loss, L, obtained from pursuing the policy rule x versus the less stabilising rule (the asset rule), divided by the di¤erence between outcomes obtained from pursuing the most stabilising rule (the augmented rule), versus the asset rule. Doing so enables us to summarise the result of our policy comparison: if the relative gain is above (below) one, the policy in question is better (worse) than the augmented rule. If it is negative than the given policy actually performs worse than the benchmark. In Table 2 we can see that as we increase the size of banking shocks the asset-price rule performs worst relative to the augmented rule because it does not distinguish between demand or supply shock driven changes in asset price. 23 The additive nature of our household's utility function allows us to take a Taylor expansion of each term and substitute it back into the original function. The labour demand function is then rearranged for monitoring work, a second order expansion taken and substitution made. This process is then repeated for the marginal cost equation. Following Galí (2008) we substitute the resulting linear term in goods sector employment for a second order term in in ‡ation using the sales equal net production constraint. 24 The welfare approximation is reported the Technical Appendix and draws on Chadha, Corrado and Meaning (2012).
By contrast the gain from a money rule rises, and while it is inferior to the augmented rule over the range we report, it is approaching the augmented rule when shocks to the supply side of the banking sector are particularly large relative to productivity and velocity shocks. 25 Focussing on the augmented rule, we now trace out the e¤ect on the policy losses of a steadily rising ratio of …nancial (monitoring, mon , and collateral, col ) to real and monetary shocks in the model outlined in Section 3. The exercise here is to vary the ratio of the standard deviation of …nancial to real and monetary shocks, m , de…ned as:
In Figure 1 we vary on the x-axis the loading m on the spread in the augmented rule, holding the relative standard deviation of the shocks …xed 26 and report the loss given by the welfare approximation (29) . We note that the loss, L, is initially declining in m . And so it seems clear that over some range when …nancial shocks are dominant in ‡ation can be better stabilised. For this illustrative calculation the standard deviation is minimised at around m = 1. 27 This simulation echoes the analytical result in Section 2, equation (14), which shows how the policy rule needs to o¤set those factors that might increase the external …nance premium. In this simulation at least, the Central Bank best achieves the stabilisation of in ‡ation by exactly o¤setting any narrowing or widening of the spread between the external …nance premium and money.
Money under alternative rules
The correlations between in ‡ation, money and the EFP are tabulated for the two di¤erent policy rules in Table 3 . Along the diagonals we show the standard deviation of money, in ‡ation and the EFP for the benchmark simulation and for the 'banking shocks dominant' simulation. In the benchmark case the standard deviations of money and EFP are not altered greatly by the augmented rule, suggesting that the augmented rule does not help stabilise the economy over and above a simple rule. However, when banking shocks dominate, the correlation between money and in ‡ation becomes positive and the correlation between the external …nance premium and money becomes negative. But when with bank dominant shocks the augmented rule is adopted, the correlation between money and in ‡ation is once more negative and the correlation between money and the EFP very small, as interest rates respond to money growth and to the EFP. Under the augmented rule, with a predominance of banking shocks, the volatility of money and particularly in ‡ation are reduced compared to the in ‡ation only rule. We treat the evidence here as illustrative of the extent to which an augmented rule of this type, which accounts for the joint information from money and …nancial spreads, may help stabilise a monetary economy. The identi…cation of this information involves the simple insight that money growth and …nancial spreads will move in opposite directions under supply shocks to …nancial markets and, provided a suitable measure of money (or liquidity) and a constellation of …nancial spreads can be located, some weight might be given to a rule of this form for monetary policy analysis.
The Augmented Rule and the Economy
The impulse responses when this augmented rule ( m = 1) is used are shown in Figures 2 and 3 . The results for both the augmented (solid) and benchmark (dotted) rule are plotted. We con…ne ourselves to depicting the e¤ects of a shock to collateral and to monitoring. 28 Figure 2 shows that with a positive collateral shock and the benchmark rule there is an increase in consumption, goods sector employment and a fall in monitoring employment. With the augmented rule the e¤ect on in ‡ation is largely ameliorated. The e¤ect on asset prices is reversed, as there is a smaller increase in goods employment and capital does not become as scarce. The e¤ect on the EFP is the same in both cases but the augmented rule helps to short circuit the e¤ects of the supply shock on in ‡ation, asset prices and bank lending. For the shock to monitoring, shown in Figure 3 , the e¤ect is to better stabilise the economy with smaller consumption, real wage and in ‡ation deviations. Again the smaller increase in good sector employment means that capital does not become quite so scarce in the case of the augmented rule and there is a very small fall rather than an increase in the asset price.
Conclusions
Disruptions to …nancial markets since August 2007 have led to the widening of spreads and a signi…cant contraction in the availability of money and credit to the private sector. To some extent this is the mirror of the situation in previous years when …nancial spreads narrowed as money and credit became more ample. The role of money to both originate as well as re ‡ect or amplify shocks seem especially important when there are shocks to the supply of loans. When setting monetary policy, central bankers monitor monetary developments (to varying degrees) but there seems to be little clear guidance as to how this information is to be used, if at all.
In this paper we have analysed how a standard in ‡ation targeting rule is altered in the presence of a credit channel and we …nd that when credit is supplied procyclically simple in ‡ation targeting may not be su¢ cient to stabilise the economy. We then examined the role of money in a DSGE model with an integrated banking sector that supplies loans and accepts deposits along the lines of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) 29 and established the pivotal role of money and the external …nance premium. While in normal circumstances money may convey little extra information to a Central Bank about the state of the economy over and above that in in ‡ation, this is not true when there are dominant shocks to the supply of credit arising from changes in the value of collateral or the costs of monitoring a loan portfolio. 30 In these circumstances, if the Central Bank responds in some measure to opposing movements in money and the external …nance premium, a much greater degree of control of in ‡ation can be achieved and so money can clearly matter. 31 We have not necessarily captured all of the features of the present crisis or the boom that preceded it, since the external …nance premium in this paper is con…ned to the relationship between banks and the private sector. Nevertheless, it is clear that an important role has also been played in recent monetary policy developments by supply of money or credit at a …nance premium internal to the …nancial system. 32 A model that captures other …nancial premia and other constituents of broad money or more generally liquidity would still lead to similar results to those in this paper, that is, the Central Bank ought to respond to shocks to the supply of money and credit when setting monetary policy. Model Appendix
A The Linearised Model
The model 33 is composed of the following linearised equations. 34 Supply of Labour:
Demand for Labour:
Supply of Banking Services: 35
reported in the main text as:
where
CIA constraint:
Aggregate Supply:
33 The full derivation of the …rst-order conditions and their log-linear formulation are described in section A of the Technical Appendix, available from our webpages. 34 The model is de…ned in the Matlab …le gmvsys.m. Standard deviation and persistence structure of the stochastic variables are de…ned in the driver …le gmvdrv.m. 35 The relationship is derived by setting b =
Marginal cost:
Mark-up:
In ‡ation:
Calvo pricing:
Marginal Value of Collateralised Lending:
Asset Pricing: 36
where 1 =
(1 ) 1+
Government Budget Constraint: 37
36 Note that in steady-state = mc and t+1 t = 1 1+ : 37 We de…ne the percentage deviation from steady state of ‡ow and stock variables by ln x t ln x, while for interest rates and ratio variables they are R t = R + b R t (rates) and r t = r + b r t (ratio, assuming r t = x t =y t ), respectively. It can be shown the approximation comes from …rst-order Taylor expansion: e x 1 + x, while for rate variable: b R t ln(1 + R t ) ln(1 + R) and for ratio: b r t = r t r = ln(x t =y t ) ln(x=y) = b
Bond Holding:
Riskless Interest Rate:
Liquidity Service of Bonds: 38
External Finance Premium:
Other Interest Rates:
Policy Feedback Rule:
Velocity:
For notational convenience the relevant log-linearised equations with variables denoting deviation from steady-state are reported in the main text without b. We consider contemporaneous shocks to a1; a2; a3; v: The benchmark model has 20 endogenous variables fc; n; m; w; q; P; ; mc; H; b; ; EF P; R T ; R B ; R; R L ; R D ; ; ; T g, 5 lagged variables fP 1 ; H 1 ; c 1 ; b 1 ; R B 1 g and 7 exogenous shocks fa1; a2; a3; "; ; ; ug. The equations (A1) through (A22), 5 lagged identities construct the model to be solved by King and Watson (1998) algorithm. Tables A1 to A3 provide a complete list of the endogenous and exogenous variables of the model and their meaning. Steady state of transfer level, Lagrangian of production constraint and base money depend on above parameters. Note: the …rst two rows show the lagged, contemporaneous and lead correlations between money and in ‡ation for the benchmark shocks and for the 'banking shocks dominate' case. Rows three and four report the same for output. An HP …lter with = 1; 600 is used. The …nal two columns sum the coe¢ cients on money from a regression of in ‡ation on lags of itself, and current and lagged terms in money and output as in King (2002) and the F-test tests for joint signi…cance of the coe¢ cients using White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors from 500 random draws from the initial simulation of 10,000. is de…ned as the loss from the welfare approximation, L, obtained from pursuing the policy rule x versus the less stabilising rule (the asset rule), divided by the di¤erence between outcomes obtained from pursuing the most stabilising rule (the augmented rule) versus the less stabilising rule (the asset rule). D t denotes deposits, t is in ‡ation, c t is consumption and EF P t is the external …nance premium. Variables are taken as deviations from steady states using a HP …lter. 
